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Sunday, July 11 , 1957

1':-IE NEXT STAGE IN FOREIGN POLICY

Ivir. President:
\lith the 1st Session of the 85th Cone;::ess moving iPto the closins
ask the indulgence of the
policy.

::Jenat~

for a:1ot:1cr r;eneral reviev.r cf the

r~aLon's

weel~s,

.

foreiGr>

As the Senate knows , I have set forth from time to time b this body vie·n

on the international situation .

I have made these pe-riodic statements beca•1se :;:

'"uelieve it is mutually helpful v:ren

!\~embers

of the Corrm1ittee on F orcign Relatior t.

"hare their observations with other Members of the Senate .

I knov1 that my ow;.1

1.::1derstandin3 has been enriched by tbe discussions v,rhich have sometimes followed
~hcse

statements .

It may be that the Executive Branch has profited from them in

'J1e same manner .
kost important, Mr, President, I have made these statements because ot
f·he vast sie-nificance that foreign policy has assumed in the lives of the people of
t he Uni.ted States.

The citizens of this country have a rizht to expect whatever

information -,-.;e can provide in this matter, whatever

li~ht

on the international situation as it confronts the nation.
expect a deep and continuing

~nterest

we may be able to shed

They have the ri:;ht to

on the part of the SeP-c..te in questions of

forei3n policy .
The State of Foreign Policy at the Beginning of the 85th Conp,ress
At the outset of this Session, on January 30 , I addressed this bocly at
length on the matter to which I return today .

It seemed to me at that time .: after
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the near disaster at Suez - that the President was in great need of support on
foreign policy from outside the confines of the White House and the executive
agencies,
The nation 1 s foreign policy was fast degenerating into a hodge -podge of
sterile Dlogans and fumbling fears,

There were many - passionate words,

religious words • frightened and frightening words and peaceful words,
was little action to reflect the more worthy of these words,

Yet there

The nobler policy

became in the language of its expression, the more meaningless it was becoming il
the pattern of its operation. Foreign policy lacked effective and consistent leadership and it lacked strength of conviction on the part of those charged with day-today operations.

There was a tendency on the part of the Executive Branch to hoar\

power and to reach out for ever -increasing power in foreign relations.

At the san

time, that Branch seemed ever more desirous of evading the responsibilities of its
already vast powers in this field,
The effects of this degeneration in foreign policy were readily apparent
last January,

Abroad, it contributed in the Middle East to what the Secretary of

State called the most seriouo threat to peace in a decade.

Yet just a short time

before, the nation had been assured that the situation in that area was improvine .
The degeneration endangered our relations with the democratic nations of Western
Europe.

Yet, the future of freedom and peace depended heavily on cooperation

with those nations,

In Eastern Europe the degeneration immobilized policy at a

critical juncture of developments.

As for the Far East, the Executive Branch kept

the curtain of igrwrance high in this country with an arbitrary arrogance towards
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the Press unprecedented in recent history.

Yet it did so at a time when events in

that recion were movine in a rr.anner which was driving the United States
increasingly into an isolated position ,
affected,

Cnly Africa appeared not to be adversely

In the lie;ht of experience elsewhere, however, there was reason to

wonder how lone this fortunate circumstance would persist,
At home, the de generation of policy, imperiled mutual restraint between
the political parties and between the Executive and Legislative Branches,

It gave

rise to a serious loss of confidence in the course of our foreign policy among the
people of the United States,

Yet the safety of the nation depended on close unity

between the parties and the branches of the government and an intelligent concern
in our relationships with the rest of the world on the part of the public,
The need, at the beginning of this session, therefore, was clearly for a
new contribution, a constructive contribution to the course of our relations with
other nations,

It seemed to me that such a contribution was required of both

parties, It was required of the Congress - particularly of the Senate,
In my remarks on January 30th, therefo re, I urged Members of this body,
on both sides of the aisle, to make that contribution,

I urged that the President be

provided freely with responsible cooperation in foreign relations.

I made clear that

as far as the Democratic rr,ajority was concerned that would be our approach,

I

expressed the hope that the same cooperation would be forthcoming from the
Republican minority and the Republican Administration.

Ylhat other course was

possible? How else were the vital interests of the nation, beyond party interests,
to be safeguarded in this nuclear aee?
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The Contribution of the Senate to Foreign Policy
During the months of the current sea sion, the Senate - both parties in the
Senate -have made the contribution that was so desperately needed,

This body

has introduced an initiative into foreign policy where little existed at the beginning
of the year, It has provided new ideas, new direction where before there was only
a timorous clinging to outmoded policies of the past and, sometimes, in the
of war 11 episodes, a danaerous distortion of those policies,

11

brink

It has produced some

order out of the administrative chaos into which the conduct of foreign policy had
been reduced by the multiple aeencies and voices of the Executive Branch,

While

the Senate refrained from interference with the essential authority of the Presiden1
in foreign relations, it has illuminated more clearly the Constitutional limitations
and responsibilities which must

eo with that

authority.

Vle can begin to see the results of this contribution .

We can see these

results in the Middle East where , at least for the moment, a measure of calm
prevails,

The work of the Senate was a major factor in inducing that development.

This body cave the President the tools he asked for to deal with the situation in tha
region,

It gave him the tools, however, only after having tried to

ma~ce

certain th

they would not be misused by the Executive Branch,
What the Senate did was to remove the press agentry from the Administra
tion' s approach to the grave problem of the Middle East,

Had the resolution the

President proposed been adopted by the Senate under the whip of urgency and in th<
fanfare of crisis with which it was presented, had it been adopted without the
changes which the Senate made after full consideration of its implications, there if
no telline what the consequences might have been.
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In its original form, the Middle East resolution was an invitation to
irresponsible action by the Executive Branch. It was an arrangement whereby
~uthority

to commit this country to war was dele gated to that Branch while

responsibility for Ylar , if it came, would have been consigned to the Congress,
was a blank

checl~

for military and economic aid.

delicate and costly instrument of policy.

It

It invited reckless use of this

In its original form the res elution r;ave

lip-service support to the United Nations where that body was least able to act
effectively,

Yet that organization was

overlool~ed

where it could perform and was

performing, throueh the emergency force in the Middle East, a most useful function
in the maintenance of peace ,
The changes made by the Senate ren1oved these wea:!.:nesses from the socalled Eisenhower Doctrine.

By linking responsibility with authority , the action of

the Senate helped to make certain that the military power of the United States would
be used with e;reat caution by the Executive Branch.

It helped to insure that in an

anxiety to avoid war, that Branch did not stumble into war .

By compelling a prompt

accounting on expenditures for economic and military aid, the Senate minimized the
lil~lihood

of a profligate or careless use of that aid,

By emphasizing support for the

UN Emergency Force in the Middle East, the changes made by the Senate did more
than give a ritualistic nod to the United Nations.

They made clear that when that

organization could perform a genuine service for peace, the people of this country
stood firmly behind its efforts .
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In the field of foreign aid, the work of the Senate and its Committees broke
through the curtain of administrative complexity that had come to conceal the decay
in this mor.;t important instrument of foreien policy.

The Senate laid the ::;round-

work for a thorough-going revision of a multi-billion dollar program which had
been rapidly losing friends abroad and support at home,

By an expenditure of less

than three hundred thousand dollars in an extensive study of foreign aid, the Senate
has already stimulated the sa vine of hundreds of n.illions of dollars of public funds.
I am confident, more over, th;1t additional funds will be saved in the future.
is more important, th(;se

savin ~ s

\.That

will not impair but are likely to enhance the

usefulness of forcicn aid in foreign policy.
In the case of the information program, the Senate 1 s contribution was to
join with the House in
Executive Branch,

cUl· bin~

a vast exF ansion that had been planned by the

By cutting the proposed budeet of the Information Aeency, the

Senate v1as applying what is, apparently, the only remedy capable of

excisin~

the

delusion of erandeur which periodically seizes this operation.
Time and again, we have seen the adverse repercussions of overseas
informational activities on such a scale as to suggest a cultural offensive on the
part of this nation, Time and again, the point has been made that there is a
an
place for /information .c>rocram in the conduct of foreign policy but that it cannot
substitute for policy, no matter how great the output of words , no matter how astute
the gimmicks .

Time and aeain, Members of Congress have stressed that the finest

ideals of this nation ought not to be sold like some mass -produced product, in the
political market-places of the world.
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Yet, time and again, the obvious has been ignored.

Time and again, the

acency bul3es with the grandiose belief that it has a short-cut, low-cost, sure-fire
formula which will win us friends, stop communism and bring about a secure peace,
if only the appropriations are large enough,

I must say that the White House did

more to encouraee that delusion this year than ever before,
In these circumstances, lv.ir, President, the Congress was compelled to
curb the activity by the only recourse open at this time - that of drastic budset
cutting.

Congress had to take that step, not merely as a matter of economy but in

order to preserve the utility of the program, If an information service has any use
at all and I believe that it has a highly important one, it is as an instrument for
communicating to others an honest understanding of the policies of the United States
and an accurate and reasonable image of its people,

The Program will not serve

this purpose effectively unless it is operated with a rational restraint and with a
de cent respect for the cultural privacy of other nations,

It will not serve this

purpose unless the nation's foreign policies are sound to begin with and the
program is closely integrated with these policies in their inception and operation.
Finally, kr. President, I should like to mention in connection with the
work of the current session, the ratification of the Statute of the International
Atomic Energy Agency.

This treaty represents the beginning of a worldwide effort

to unfold the peaceful possibilities and to curb the dangers inherent in this great new
source of energy.

By consenting to ratification of the Statute, the Senate has risen

to a great challenge.

I trust that the Executive Branch shall act under this Treaty,

with a prudence which will justify the faith that has been reposed in the President,
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lv1ay I say that such delays as were encountered in the ratification of the Treaty,
while the Senate devised Constitutional safeguards, might have been avoided had the
advice of this body been sought before the proposal was made to the world.

Again,

however, the restless eagerncs s of the public relations experts apparently took
precedence over the preparation of sound policy,
The matters which I have been discussing to this point, Mr. President,
are the most tangible results, the most significant legislative results of this
session's work in foreign relations.

Members of the Senate have made other

contributions, less tangible perhaps but which, in the lone run, may have the most
far -reaching and beneficial results.
How, for example, can we estimate the contribution of the distinguished
majority leader j_Mr. Johnso!;./ and the distinguished minority leader

Knowlan~./ or the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations

{ivir.

{ili.r, Greer.:]

and the ranking minority member j_Mr. \"Tiley} in keeping politics out of foreign
affairs in the Senate, in keeping the preponderant national interest constantly in
perspective?
How can we estimate the contribution of the Senator from Arkansas /Mr.
Fulbrigh_!/ and the Senator from Minnesota

{Mr.

Humphrey_/ in compelling a more

rational approach to the situation in the Middle East?

VVhat may result in the

years ahead from the brilliant dissents on foreign aid policy, the dissents of the
Senator from Georgia

{iii.r.

Russel_!/ the Senator from Oregon

the Senator from Louisiana /Mr. Long/?

j_"FVlr,

Mors~} and

What effect did the logic of the Senator

- 9 from Massachusetts /Mr. Kenneny_/ have in stimulating the beeinnings of a policy
on Poland and Eastern Europe?

What of the contribution of the Senator from Iowa

j_}.;~r, Hickenloope~:l and the minority leader j_'11ir. Knowlan:!./ in safeguarding the
powers of the Senate in connection with the Atomic Energy Statute?

What of the

initiative of the majority leader j_fY-r. Johnsoi/ with respect to the over-all
problems of United States relations with Soviet Russia?
And how can we estimate the influence of the many Members of the Senate,
of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, y:ho raised the question of the
implications of testing nuclear weapons?

This ceneration and the e;enerations to

come may owe an incalculable debt to the Senator from New Mexico /Mr. Anderscr;:}
the Senator from Rhode Island /Mr. Pastore/ and the Senator from Tennessee

{i11r.

Gor~} and others.

These Senators broucht this grave question into the light

of public discussion while the Executive Branch dawdled with it in the darkness of
the secrecy-shrouded il.tomic Energy Commiosion.

The contribution of these

lv1embers to our understandinE, of the problems of nuclear weapons and of othero on
other international problems can be summed up in a sentence.

They have had the

coura e e to look at the realities of the international situation and to speak out on
these realities.

In so doing, they have provided new ideas which have found or

are likely to find their way into the nation's foreign policy,

In so doing, they have

provided the initiative which was desperately needed by the Executive Branch to
stop the drift towards national disaster.
V.'e are ending the ses sian, Mr, President, with a more effective and a
more economical foreign policy.

V!e are ending it with policies which provide a
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better outlook for peace.
ment.

The Senate has contr\buted a great deal to this depart -

In recent months, there has been every evidence that the President and the

Secretary of State have come more and more to see its necessity and advantage.

The Present 0tate of Foreign Relations
It would be easy to overstress the achievements.

Let me repeat, there-

fore, that what has been obtained during this session is only a better outlool;: for
peace, not peace itself.

\"le have checked the descent into international chaos

but we are only at the beginning of the aocent towards international stability.
Vle have still to reexatrlle the many aspects of the present mechanics of

policy and policy itself in the penetrating lieht of Senatorial and public review.
The improvements of the past few months will

quic ~J.y

prove illusory unless we act

to maintain and extend them.
At home, we are still confronted Yv'ith the need to develop enduring
practices not only of bi-partisanship but of what may more properly be termed,
trip artisanship.

Apart from the need for the responsible restraints of bi-partisan-

ship between the two parties, there is a need for continuing arrangements which
provide a third factor - responsible cooperation between the President and the
Concreas.
VIe have still to improve the operations of the foreign aid and information
programs and to coordinate these and other
foreign policy.

undertaldn~s

abroad more closely with
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Abroad, we have obtained only a n"omentary breathing spell in the international situation, and this 1 I emphasize 1 is not to be equated with peace.
has been only a limited recovery in
after the breakdo"vn at .::Juez .
Em:ope.
in~

c~operation ~ith.!!:_e

There

'iiestern democracies

The division of Germany still haunts the future of

Vlith respect to Vlestern Europe, we have yet to forr..:-Julate an understand-

of how best to relate our national intere.sts to the European unity that appears

to be emerdne in the plans of Euratom and the European Common Market.

\le

have only begun to grope with the changes h the situation in Eastern Europe.

For

the Far East, policy remains imprisoned in the past while events move that region
rapidly into a new era.

In the Middle East, there is still only a tenuous truce.

v.
"'"'
v

have still to go beyond words and establish in practice sound relations with the new
nations of Asia c:md Africa.

We have still to advance the concept of hemispheric

cooperation to a hip,her cround of common interest with the nations of Latin Amer:i ca .
Finally, Mr. President, we need still to explore the whole scope of relationa ·w ith the Soviet Union, with a view to lessening the threat and dan r: ers of
nuclear war .

A temporary standstill ar.;reement on nuclear testing, even if it were

obtained might reduce a health hazard to the human race.

It would not, however,

end the possibility of the sudden death of civilization.

A New Star;e in Foreign Policy

'Where do we turn next, Mr. Preside nt?
kind of holding action for peace.

As I have noted, we now have a

That is an important achievement but we cannot

ignore the fact that a holding action is not forever.

The situation in the world does
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not stand still.

International events flow continuously and we shall either advance

with them or be submerged in their backwash,

Vfe shall either move towards

greater instability or towards greater security for all nations,
That is why, Mr. President, I believe we must ask ourselves whether the
time is not becoming ripe to move forward from a holdine action towards the consolidation of peace,

I am avVare, Mr . President , that it is beyond the power of thi.s

country alone to determine whether or not there shall be peace,
beyond the power of the Soviet Union alone or any nation alone,
matters v1hich do not rest in the hands of men or nations,

But it is also
There are some

What does lie within the

realm of all nations, however, is to establish the ::ind of policies which will permit
peace, if, in fact, the opportunity to ma?.:e it is e;iven to us.
It has been said many ti.mes, and correctly, that there will be no peace
unless there is a change in the attitudes of the Soviet Union.

It has not been said,

yet, it must be said, that peace also depends on the attitudes which underlie our own
polic~

The attitudes which shape policy, Mr. President, are human attitudes.
Because they are, policy is a r.clixture of the able and the inept, of the e;enerous and
the selfish, of the courageous and of the fearful.

But for too lone;, Mr. President,

I believe policy as desie;ned by the Executive Branch has reflected too heavily the
fearful.

To be sure, we have had the courageous words, the able words, and the

generoua words .

Yet the Executive Branch has turned too often to fear to find

justification for the actions it pursues or fails to pursue ,
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There is fear in this country, but there is also a fullness of spirit that
pe rrr.its us to deal honestly and confidently with the realities of the w orld, if v;e
\'till,

J. policy which en.phasizes the fear and ienores this spirit does not do justice

to the people of the United State s.

It serves neither our traditions nor our interests

I shall speak frankly on this point bec a use time is runnin3 out on peace.
lite shall either face the issue squarely now or history --if, in fact, there is anyont

left to "vrite it -- history may well be at a loss to explain to succeedinG generations
how the leadership of the present ae neration sacrificed the a reatness of this nation
on an altar of irresponsible fear,
I

asl~

the Senate, Mr. President, to think back through recent years to the

major issues of foreign policy which have come before this body - think back to
the Treaties of Peace, to lv!utual .Security, to N.A.T.O., to the Information pregram, to the innumerable aid-programs which we have considered, to the most
recent measures - the Middle East resolution and even to the Atomic Energy Agenc :
:Jtatute,

Most of these measures were generous in original design.

were acts of great courage and foresight.

Many of them

Most of them, in short, had high con-

structive merit, in terms of our national interests and ideals, in terms of world
peace, in terms of universal freedom,
Yet, were they allowed to stand primarily on this merit?

'.'!e re they

allowed to reflect . in full measure the finest attitudes of the people of the United
States? Or "'as not the grim spectre soon raised in justification of all of then.?
The 3 rim spectre of the advanta ge v;hich would fall to cor.nmunism i.f we did not
act in oome particular fashion or other?

And has it not been raised again and

again? Indeed has not that motivation, that motivation of fear, almost invariably

-14been turned into the principal motivation for any major action of policy?
~s

The fact

that it has been made to swamp virtually every other consideration.
We may well ask ourselves v..rhether or not that is the principal reason why

the policies of the nation are looked upon so often as essentially ner;ative; why it has
seemed for years that in the arena of world affairs the Russians act and this country
merely reacts.

l:"•!e may well as L ourselves whether or not that is the principal

reason why after the expenditure of $60 billion on forei e;n aid and hundreds of billions
on defense, security still eludes us; vthy a sense of living on the edc;e of doom has
not ceased to haunt the nation,
Ue may even ask ournelves whether a policy derived so heavily from this
attitude of fear is adjusted to the dimensions of the actual Soviet threat.

If it is not,

if policy has been geared instead to dimensions swollen by a stimulated fear, M:r. ,
President, then the people of the United States have paid and shall continue to pay
an unnessary tribute of billions of dollars to this

fear,

'i1Te may yet pay for it

with the lives of millions of citizens.
This Senate does not need to be told that there is a basis for a valid fear
of the aegressive doctrines of the Coviet Union,

Y!e have seen that aggressivenes::-

expressed many times, beginning with the vested interect which communism displayed in prolonr;ing the sufferinG of \"!estern Europe after Vlorld Vlar II.

1:Te

have

seen it most recently in the dancerous game of Soviet arms diplcmacy in the Middle
East and in the ruthlessness of the totalitarian re p re s sian in Hun gary.
Certainly there is a basis for a deep concern with Soviet totalitarianism
on the part of this country, on the part of free countries everywhere,

There is

-1:;also 1 how ever 1 crave danger in a policy which w ould inflate this concern beyond
actual proportions, .• ,'lct h~_!he inflation derives from an

e~~cessive

eagerness to

obtain appropriations a nd increased Executive power or from simple miscalculation,

The inflation is an invitation to a blind retreat into an irresponsible is alation

ism or to a blind advance into an equally irresponsible internationalism.
A_ policy based on a faar -laden inflation of the Soviet threat, in the not ve .
long-run, can only lead as it has been leading to a fruitless search for absolute
security, whether it be in a non-existent fortress A merica or non-existent Fortre :
Free-\.'orld, and consequent actions of disillusionment, when it cannot be found.
VThile this futile search is being pursued, we may well i e nore the possibilities
of maldng this nation relatively more secure than is now the case in what is and
will always be a dan gerous world,
The international problems of the United States and of freedom, 1\ti r.
President, did not begin with the birth of communist tyranny.
w ith its inevitable

pas sing, Yet the justifications for

They will not end

E}~ecutive

actions that are

presented to the Congress sometimes suggest that this distorted concept, obliviou.
to several thousand years of human experience, does in fact dominate forei gn p oli c
If th 2 next staee in forei gn relations is to be a constructive one, if the

leadership of this country is to be prepared to be gin the lone and painful ascent to
international stability, then fear as a predominant base of foreig n policy must yie :
to faith ,

I do not speak of faith in the rulers of the Russians,

of an unquestioning faith in the governments of allied nations.

I do not speal: even
The nature of

R ussian leadership leaves little margin for faith.. As for allies, they are brought

-16tor:;ether as their interests and ideals coverge; they may separate, if their interests
and ideals should diverge.
I
spea~:

spea~:,

rather, of faith in ourselves, in the people of this country.

I

of faith in the capacities of human freedom to meet the challent;e of peace

which, in this 20th Century, is the challenge of life itself.
It is hi eh time, Mr. President , to express this faith in the policies of the

nation.

It is time to put aside the excess of fear that can only undermine the
It is time to recoenize that if the Soviet Union

vitality of this country's freedom.
is

stron~

in a material sense, this nation is and can remain stronger, p rovided

it is united and properly led.

It is time to recognize that if

freedom in the ideolo:-y of communism , there are even

th~re

~r.ceater

are dangers to

dancers to com-

munism in the doctrin.;s of liberty.
This shift in the attitude underlyin:::; policy , lv.ir, Preside nt, seems to me
to be an essential prerequisite to

pro~res

s towards a more durable peace , recard-

less of \/hat the aussians may or may not do.

Ii the leadership of this country re-

flects what I believe the people of this country feel we shall see this shift in the
near future.

Vfe shall move from a holding action to a new stae,e of policy - to a

policy of positive action for peace .
And if we are to have that kind of policy there are measures which can and
must be ta:,en bath with respect to the machinery of policy and with respect to
present policies themselves.

-17Improvements in the

l'v~achinery

of Policy

f_ t horr.e, the ::;ains made ciu rin e the past few rr.onths in coope ration, betv,reen ilin-ocrats and _{epublicans and between the .2xecutive and Le : _-islative
Branches Lust be consolidated,

The continuance of this tripartisanchip is essen -

tial ii the ru:.;cir.fJ urn posoible wej. r_:ht of this country is t? be broue;ht to bear on the
international problen:s that conf ront us.

Tripartisanship cannot be a casual

arrangement, to be indul ee d in vthenever the Executive Branch feels so disposed
or vthen one party fears the p olitical repercussions of a particular course of policy.
If coope ration is casual, if it is r;iven political overtones, v,re shall have n.ore

"slippa:ze ", if I rr:<:.y 'borrow a term from the ~ecretary of State, such as occurred
in the sudden request a few weel:s aco to send Senators to the London disarmament
rr_eetings and then the sudclen. postponen,ent.
It seen.s to r.:le, there is a way in which close and continuin e; cooperation

between the Branches and between the parties can be maintained in foreign policy.
It depends first of all on the will on all sides to cooperate, the will to avoid seeking
partisan

advanta;~e

or either

E~(ecutive

affect the vital interests of this nation,

or Le r-;islative don.ination in matters which
If the will is prese nt, then I 'believe the

follo..-tin ;:; actions will provide adequate machinery for continuance tripartisanship:
1 ,

Let the :?res ident appoint able men of both p arties to high

policy-making po sitions in those asencies of the Exeuutive Branch
concerned with foreir,n relations.

Surely if the sentin:ents of the

_!?eople of the United States, as reflected in the party ratios in
Cone; res s are any indication, these appointments will include a
fev,r r.no re qualified Democrats than is now the case.
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2.

Let the President and the Secretary of :=:tate, as a nJatter of

re 2ular practice , a::lvise ·.vith the n ,ajority and 1Y,inority
both p2.rtiGs

~~:the

~eader s

of

Senate a:1d the Chairn:an and ranl-:in ;-; nd·.1ority

mernbe1· of the Corr.n..,ittee on Foreir;n Relations in advance of all
rrajor decisions on :Lorejr:n policy .

Y.'he n mattero arise which are

likely to involve action by the House of Representatives , then the
correspondin~ Iv~embers

of that body shoulJ l:e it:.cluded,

In the end, the responsibility for decision in foreien policy, of course,
muot rest vtith the President,

He cannot be bound by the advice he receives fron:

the le 3iolativ~ rr.err.bers nor cao he

e~pect

to bind the House or Cenc:.te until each

has consented to at:.j' ;ar!:icu.lar rr_easurc in a le::;islative act.
recular consultation o£ the

~.ind

Nevertheless,

I am su;:;r:;estine can do n:uch to avoid partisanship

and to prorr.ote rrJutual understandin3 between the Branches in rr_atters of foreign
policy ,

It should be of aJvanta3e to the President ,

the Con ~ re ss ,

IV~ost

It should be of advanta3e to

of all it chould be of value to the people of the United :=:tate s

who :_:;ain frorn an effective and united 1)clicy and \vho pay dearly for the converse.
I er.r.phaoize that the consultation l"Luot be a
s orr.etir£ e 2, esture.
are finally rr.ade

;~ y

It must

ta~_e

rc ~ular

an,J continuins practice, not a

· lace, n_o:c·eover, ccfore , not after, the decisions

-

--

the President .

J..s for forei, ·n aid

the in.provercenta made possible by this year's

Conr;ressional inquiries C:!.nd lc;:i:Jlation must be carried out in spirit and in action
by the

E :~e cutive

B;:anch,

finally be eliminated,

Unless this i3 do n e , the decay in this pro2ram vrill not

Unleos this is done, the diGGents expressed in opposition to
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foreisn c..id on the floor of the Senate this year rr.ay well become the majority
opinion in the years ahead ,
In the ;:t.b sence of sienificant chanee s in the international situation, there
is every re2.son to expect a steady reduction in r;rc..nts of foreip;n economic aid and
an increz.se in the p roportion of this

j_")ro~; rar.c,

that is carried on a loan basis.

There is eve-cy reason to e::pect that military aid will be adjusted r.clore effectively
to the actual needs of national defense and less to the predilections of the civilian
and t'.Lilitary bureaucrc..cy of the J2:;:ecutive Branch and counterparts in other
countries.
The President U.fl:d the Conr;ress must also see to it that not only the_
fo r e i r; n aid p ro e:ram 1: ut the information r:ro p,rarr, , the Central Intelli gence l.zency,
a n d c:.ll other overseao a.ctivitbs are broueht into close coordination w ith forei p,n
p olicy,
done.

There has bee n improvement ii1 this connection but r.c,uch remains to be
I be lie ve vve have oeen ar.c.:1) le evidence of how r<,uch remains to be done in

the indecision, in the starts and

sto~:; ::.;,

that have characterized the conduct of

ne (_,otiations at London under lv. r. Ctas sen.
The Department of :::tate, under the Fresident, is the lo r)cal and tradishirl~

ti onal place to center coordination of foreign p olicy.

Does the Department

its responsibility or is it denied thin responsibility?

Is there somethine wrone; in

the orr,anization of that Department which p1·events it frorn e::ercisine the
responsibility? If that is the case it is incumbent on the President and the
Concress to correct whatever it io that is wrong.

It does not help to scatter
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matters of foreien policy thr.:mghout the Executive Branch, to the point of
irresponsibility,

That is what we have had in recent years and that is why policy

has so frequently bordered on the chaotic ,
As it is now actions can be taken in innumerable places within the vast
jungle of agencies of the

E.~ecutive

Branch, each with its extensive overseas

operations, actions of the gravest consequence to this country,

Yet it is virtually

impossible to fix responsibility for the action without a Coneressional
investigation,

Even with an investigation there is no certainty that the country will

be able to obtain a satisfactory explanation and to prevent repetition,
Finally, !vi;.• President, I believe a concerted effort must be made to
reduce the size of cf:':icial establishments overseas -both military and civilian.
Not only are these establish!nents costly in a monetary sense , but they can and
are building an undercurrent of resentment towards this country in many countries.
How many more demonstrations like those of the past months in Formosa and
Lebanon and, most recently, in the Philippines, are waiting to be touched off by
some explosive incident elsewhere?
The announced reduction of military forces in Japan is a step in the right
direction and others should follow pro1T1ptly ,

Has there been any reduction in the

installation of thousands of official Americans on Formosa?

Or now that the heat

of the riots there has cooled will the Executive Branch operate on the assumption
that the Congress, the people of the United States have also cooled in their
determination to deal with this question?
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I trust that if the Executive Branch chooses the path of inertia in this
matter of the size of overseas installations, the Senate will not,

I hope that the

brmed Cervices Committee under its able Chairman the distinguish<..d Senator
from Geor~ia /N1r, Russell/ will give particular attention to this matter as it
effects the military and that the Committee on Foreign Relations will study the
problem as it involves civilian personnel overseas,

Circumstances require us to

maintain substantial numbers of military and civilian personnel abroad but let us
mal·e certain that these numbers are realistically adjusted to actual need,

Western Europe
I should like to turn now from the mechanics of policy to the substance of
policy, to a consideration of meas'.lre s which will support a positive policy for
peace in various critical areas of the world,
this connection than 17estern Europe,

No single area is more important in

No single factor is more essential than the

preservation of the unity of vVestern Europe and the continuance of the close ties of
the United States with the democracies of that region.
There is nothinc new in these observations.

They have been reiterated

by successive Presidents , by successive Secretaries of States,
reaffirmed in repeated actions of the Congress,

They have been

What is less evident, what

requires repeated statement is that the military arraneements of Western
European Union and of the North Atlantic Treaty Oreanization are no longer
sufficient to maintain these ties,

Vfhether it be a lessenin g of the fear of Soviet

attack, whether it be the example set by this country, whether it be a growing
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sense of futility in the light of advances in weapons tedmology or v;hether it be
simple economic necessity, the mood and the actuality of disarmament now
prevails in \ i.7 estcrn Europe ,

This mood, this actuality has made a.cademic a good

deal of the discussion of disarmament,

We already have the beginnings of

disarmament - one sided disarmament in advance of any agreement on the matter,
There is no point in pretending that this is not the case,
said for facing this reality.

There is rr,uch to be

There is much to be said for seeking to reinforce

the essential intimacy of -:.restern civilization by other means,

This intimacy may

prove of even creater importance in the long-run than a head-count of the men
under arms in N/1 TO,
?ortunately, the Europeans are moving to streng then their own unity both
in the field of nuclear ener :3y and in the

fie~d

of intra-European trade.

The fate of

Euratom and the European Common Market, now under consideration in the
Parliaments of the European democracies, will have a great bearinz on the
progress and the peace of l 7estcrn Europe and the vvorld,

·v.rhile this country is

not directly involved in these undertakings, our official attitudes with respect to
them will have a highly significant bearing on their outcome,
If the \·/estern

:t~uropeans

do, in fact, pool their resources in a common

effort to develop and exploit nuclear ener gy it will have profound repercussions
for the United States.

I need hardly remind the Senate that the initial development

of the atomic bomb in this country durinr; Vl orld War II drew heavily on the genius
of scientists born in Europe.

Vlithout this contribution the race for this decisive

weapon might have ended in another fashion.

VTith the echoes of Soviet and British
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tests of hydror;en borr.bs still reverberating and with developments in nuclear
France, Ewed.::n
ener3y mavins forv;ard rapidly in I
and elsewhere, I need hardly remind the
Senate that no country han a monopoly on the scientific talent in this field,
A :r:ooled effort by \'!estern European scientists and technicians under
Euratom may vvell produce enormous nev; developments in nucle ar enerGY•

That

could be a Godsend to the po.ver-hunr,ry countries of Europe and the world ,

It

could

ma:~e

a great contribution to <1ll manl;:ind,

It could be of great advantage to

this country, provided we have established a sound pattern of cooperation with
Euratom, provided •;
source of progress

3

1:_9:~c_2:_ot

b~_inertia

excluded ourselves from

t~is

great potential

and by the limited vision of our leadership in these

matters.
If the ine::ti<-' ! s

Energy Commission a:re

r1 cse nt
lil:~!y

and vision is absent, the vaults of the Atomic

to bulge with secrets that are no longer secret,

with facts that are euarded only from the people of the United States.

Meanwhile

the scientific leadership of this country in nuclear energy may well vanish in the
rapid flow of pro3ress elscvthere,

Little may remain to us except the smug

assurances and the rLysterious mumbo-jumbo that have masqueraded as leadership
in this vital field,
P.s in the case of the development of unity in the nuclear field, the
emergence of a common marh:ct b VJe stern Europe will also have great
significance for the economy of the United States.

As the Senate knows, this

country's larf5est volume of imports ancl expor ts are exchanged with the Vle stern
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European countries.

Total trade is already approaching $10 billion a year.

This

trade is a not insignificant factor in the stability of our own economy, and it is a
rrJatter of vital necessity to many of the less powerful economies of -v"le stern
Europe.
The United Gtates stands to gain imr.;Jeasurably in trade from the higher
productivity and the hi ::;he r levels of consumption that are likely to result from the
developn.ent of a con:1mon market in \i.'estern Europe,

On the other hand our trade

can be seriously damaged by that development unless we establish mutuallyadvantaeeous relatione hips ';tith the emcr gine; common market,
It seems to me,

lv~r .

President, that the time has come for the Congress

as well as the Executive Branch to pay very close attention to these major trends
towards intecration in

·:.restern

Euro:;?e.

They are, I believe, eminently de sir able

developments from the point of view of this country.

They have not only economic

validity for Yles tern Europe but great political implications as well.

Like the

European coal and steel community before then,, they are safeguards ae;ainst the
narrow nationalistic rivalries in that re gion which have twice in

01.n-

lifetime set

fire to the world .
The intcre sts of this couni:ry, it seems to me, require t!:at we stay
abreast of these developments pointing towards unity in ':!estern Europe, that we
encouraee them, that we

see:~

mutually-advantar,eous r elationships with the

institutions that are emergjng throu gh them.

To tha t end, IV1r. President, I

suggest that the time "Day be ripe for a formal conference w ith the
of Euratom and the European Common

l\l~arket.

IV~ember

nation s

In fact, the time may be ripe for

conferences in these two fields am ong all the NATO members.

- 25 -

Eastern Europe
In

~astern

Europe, l:v1.r, President, we have opened a contact during the

past few months which may prove of great long-range significance in the creation
of conditions of stability throuehout the entire continent,

I refer to the loan

ag!'eement with Poland, to what may prove to be the be e;innings of an affirmative
policy with regard to all of Eastern Europe.
In substance, as the Senate l:nov..rs, this

a~reement

provides a line of

credit of $95 million, to be used by the Poles lareely for the purchase of wheat and
cotton and coal mining machinery in this country, To make this loan was not an
or the Secretary of State,
e asy decision for the President/ The loan is going to a country which has a
government headed by Communists,

It is going to a country in which Soviet

military forces are present in large numbers,

It is going to a country whose

foreign policies are aligned with the Soviet Union,
In these circumstances there are obvious risks in the course that has
been set.

The commodities to be exported under the loan could be diverted to

Soviet consumption despite safeguards against such a diversion and thus serve no
useful end of the Polish people,

They may help to make the Polish Communist

regime more tolerable to the Poles,

The loan may be defaulted, and in that case,

we shall have given away, in effect, close to a hundred million dollars of
products.
\That is there to balance these real, these obvious risks?

There is the

fact that we are trading commodities which for the most part are in surplus in
this country and for which we have every richt to expect payment .

There is the
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fact that the present government of Poland has asserted a greater decree of
independence of the Soviet Union in internal affairs than any of its predecessor s .
T hat gove r nment is in office by virtue of an election which most observers agree
was the freest that Poland has had since VT orld Vvar II .
has made peace with religion .

It is a e;overnment that

It is a covernment that has permitted some

exercise of freedom of press and assembly.
and the Secretary of State
Had the President/not dealt with this government, is there not every
likelihood that Poland would have gone the way of Hungary?

Is there not every

likelihood that the n1as sacre of thousands of patriots would have been repeated?
Is there not every likelihood that the refugees would have streamed out of Poland
seeldng a haven in this country or wherever else a sanctuary micht be offered?
And was there not every

li~ .elihood

that in the end Poland would have found itself ,

as Hungary is nov1, under tichter Russian and Communist control, under a
heavier boot of repression?
Some years ae;o, there was a great deal of loose
of Eastern Europe.

about

11

liberation 11

In the past year, we have seen the actual forces of liberation

at vtork in tv;o countries , in Hungary and in Poland .
worked violently.

tall~

In the one, they have

In the other, violence has been minimal.

\'lith respect to the first, Hun:::;ary, we have provided countless words of
condolence for the martyrs of the uprisings.

Vle have had U . N. resolutions of

condemnation , sponsored by the United States and others , leveled at the
Communist opp r essors of the people .
Soviet intervention .

We have had a U.N . report condemning

This body also passed a resolution on the subject by
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unanimous vote.

The President admitted thousands of refugees who fled from the

terror of Budapest.

The United States has spent tens of millions of dollars to

care for these refugees and to move them to safe havens,

All of these measures

express deep sympathy on the part of the people of the United States and other
free nations for the Hungarians who have been victimized by tyranny,
Have these measures, however, produced the liberation of Hungary?
Or is the lid of oppression now sealed more tightly than ever?
example of the
Poland?

~:ind

Is Hur.gary an

of liberation that those who used this term so r_:;libly desire in

In Rumania? In Czechoslovakia?

In Bulgaria?

In Albania?

Or is there not something to be said for the course that the President
and the Secretary of State have
now taken with r espe ct to Poland?

I

Is there not something to be said for a

course which anticipates a gradual change in the political structure of Eastern
Europe , throuch the worldng of internal forces, through the influence of peaceful
trade and other contacts with free nations?
It seems to me that those in this country who object to the Administration 's

course in Poland must either recognize that they are indulGing merely in vocal
or other forms of protest while they let matters rest as they are in Eastern
Europe or the y must be prepared , in the last analysis, to shed the blood of
Americans to change them,
I believe, as I have said on other occasions, it is a serious erro r to
re gard the r e[;ion of Eastern Europe as a single entity , to be treated in foreign
policy by identical measures ,

Each of these countries , now dominated by

communism , has a set of unique national problems and unique national traditions.
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Each country will grope for freedom in its own particular way, as we have seen in
Yucoslavia, in Hun;:;ary and, as I believe, we are now see in~ in Poland,
·i-re do not serve the cause of freedom or the interests of this country
when we blocl:ade these Eastern European countries as a closed Communist
corporation and merely seethe in the juice of our own moral indignation,

In so

doing we close only our own eyes and indulr;e ourselves in the lm:ury of selfrighteousness,
It seems to me, 1\t_r, President, that vJe have much rnore to rsain and so
too have the peoples of Eastern Europe if v;e extend our commercial, our
diplomatic and other contacts v; ith each country of that region as the occasion
presents itself, r ather than by attemptin[:, to deal with these pe oplc s as a mass,
in the abstr2..ct, and frorr, afar.

Let rr.e r;;al:e clear that I am not suggestine a

hard-hitting , short-cut, sure -fire, policy for endine; con:munism and buildinc
democracy
of the aid

overni~jht

pro~ ram

in Easte rn Europe throu3h an expansion in the operations

or the inforn:a tion program , or the C.I.A. or all three

combined.
The countries of E2..stern

Euro~)e ,

in varying degree, have been

searching for secure national freedom and for popularly responsible government
not only since the Communists have arrived but for decades and even centuries .
They are not going t o find these coals overnicht, re cardle s s of what v;e do or fail
to do.

':.'hat I am su;:;2estine therefore is an approach of the open mind and

critical and discriminating judgment.

It seems to me that as a first step, the

Secretary of .3tate in his travels abroad might see fit to visit those countries of
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Eastern Europe where lie feels it may be useful to go and to brinG bac~: a re port_
to the people of the UnitcJ
I

mal ~e

~~ tates

on what is actually going on in them.

the sugr;e stion not out of mere curiosity but because the

situation in Easte rn Euro1)c , particularly as it involves Poland and
Czechoslovakia, is hie hly relevant to the overriding problem of the stability of
E urope,

The Senate -.;,rill recall that Vl orld Vfar II was precipitated primarily by

the forced collapse of the independence of these two nations.

It is difficult to

visualize how peace in Europe can now be built unless both countries regain a
secure and independent national existence,

I cannot see hov,r they shall obtain

such an e;:is tence without a substantial commercial, diplomatic and cultural
contact w ith the nations to the \';-es t, including the United States.
they will inevitably remain closely tied to the Soviet Union,

In its absence,

They will inevitably

retain their vested interest in the Soviet policy of perpetuatine the division of
Ger many.

In that sense 1 especi.ally 1 they v1ill remain a continuinG source of

instability in Europe.
Franl~ly,

I do not know,

with Eastern Europe is possible,

lv~r.

President, whether substantial contact

A few years back, those nations themselves

made that contact impossible, lar gely by their arroeant and irresponsibl e
behavior towards citizens of the United States,
respect in Yu goslavia,

There have been chane;e s in thi s

There are now sic;ns of other chan ges , particularly in

Poland and, perhaps, there will be others elsewhere in the near future.

I

believe the Secretary of State could perform a highly useful service by a :firsthand exploration of the significance of these changes.
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The Far East
Turnin.z to the other side of the slobe, kr . P resident, I should like to
refer to a speech on China policy which the .Secretary of State made in San
Francisco on June 28.

This was the fullest official treatment of the question that

we have had in many months.

It contained nothing new.

It contained little with

which this body would disa:sree, in the light of the various res elutions which have
been adopted on Cor.Gnmnist China in recent years.
The .Jenate has expressed itself many times in opposition to admitting
Communist China to the United Nations; the Gecretary reaffirmed the opposition in
his speech.

The .Jenate has expressed itself in opposition to the recognition of

Pekinc; the .Secretary reaffirmed this opposition,
resolutions.

I supported these .Senate

I believe they were sound resolutions.

It is not so much, therefore, v1ith the content of the Secretary's speech
that I find myself in disacreement,

Cnc could

ta~~e

issue, perhaps, with some of

his reasoning and his assumptions of certain functions of moral judc;ment which
more properly belong to the clerc;y and to history.

In e;eneral , however, it is not

what is included but what is omitted that is disturbing.

After all, what has been the

the principal is sue related to China policy during the current se s sian?

Has it

been the question of the admission of Communist China to the U.N. or the
recognition of
I am av1are.

Pe~dnc;?

These questions have not been seriously at issue as far as

Yet the Secretary's

remarl~s

in San Francis co v1ere larcely a

justification of the position he has taken on these questions.

-31. .' h _re in hi s s peech, however , does the Secretary mention the ban which
has been imp osed on the press of the nation with re 3 ar::l to e; atherin g the news in
China?

In a rr:.ajor sta terr,ent of polic y , the first on the subject in many months , the

Secretary chose to on--,it refe rence to the one qu e stion that has been seriously at
issue, to the one question that has raised serious doubts about China p olicy .
speech failed even to include n .ention of this very si 5 nificant question .
rr, al~e

His

It did not

clear why the J-.dministration h as found it necessary to deny to the people

of the United State s a princip al source of impartial information on one of the most
corr,ple;:: and d a n ::,erous situa tions tha t this country has ever faced - - the source
which could be provide d by the public press of this nation.
P reviously w e had been told that the ban on travel of newsmen to the
China rr:ainland, in effe c t , w as an essential elerr.ent of hi z h policy respectin g the
:=-' ar East .

Rar e ly, in rr.y years in Con ::, re ss, ho y,rever, have I h e ard wea:. er

ar ::,uments presented b y officials to supp ort a view than those on this p oint which
cam ::: frorr. the ::Z"ecutive Branch .
·.: e have b een told by the

i~ dministration ,

moreover, that if the p eopl e

are not satisfied with the inforn:ation w hich the Executive Branch chooses to re le a se on the China situation they can turn in effect to forei e;n ne v1spap ers w ho h a ve
repres e ntativ es in China or that ou r p ress can hire correspondents from forei g n
countries to

~o

to China.

\ .re have also been told, not by the CourtG but by the

i.dministration, that a free p ress, in effect, means freedorr, to r ublish the
ne w s but not to r,ather and verify it, that the ri ght to :;ather and verify ne v1 s, a t
least

~s

far as international matte rs arc concerned, is contr o llable by the

I:xecutivc Branch.

-32Is it any wonder that the Secretary of State did not include a statement
on this significant question in his ren:arks on China policy on June 28?

Has there

ever been a more invidious invita tion to irresponsible and arbitrary g overnrnent
than the concept of the press in relation to forei z n policy which the Exe cutive
Branch has advanced in this matter?

P. free press in foreign policy, Mr.

President, no less than in other n.atters, is not a ri ght to be granted or denied by
any Adr.c, inistration.
country.

It is an absolute necessity for free cover nn.e nt in this

The press in foreign policy , as in other

governrr. ent po licy.

n~atters,

is not a tool of

It is an independent and essential check on th<J..t p olicy .

As one who has had occasion to find many tirr.es a 3 r eate r accuracy in the
nation's !=lress than in the p recs releases of th':! Executive Branch-- under both
Derr,ocratic and Republican J,drr.inistrations -- a s one who prefers the re po rts of
the press and newsmen of this n ation to those o£ the press and ne ws r.c_en of forei s n
nations, I arr. compelled to tal•e issue with the J,dr.cinistration on this question.
It is difficult enough for /.me rican correspondents to secure information
abroad in the best of circumstances.

The restrictions under which they wo r:, in

many countries are too well l<novvn to require repetition.

It is bad

enou~h

when the

nation's press is hemmed in and prevented from the full exe rcise of its functions
'uy the arbitrary acts of other e ovcrnments.
limited by the arbit r ary action of the

It is intolerable whe n its freedom is

~xecutive

Branch of our own gove rnn'1e nt.

L e[-';itin.ate representatives of the press of this nation n :ust be free to r:-; o
anywhere that they are able to so to brint; 1:.ac1' inforn' ation which may 'ue of value
in informin g the people of the United 3tates.

The press and the public , not the
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Congress and certainly not the Executive Branch, must be the judge of where
their representa t ive s ,

r '~

to r,o and vv:hat news is of value,

If for reasons of high policy or other circumstances the Executive

Branch cannot extend the sanction and protection of the passport, then it ought not
to do so,

If leeitirnate members of the press, however, are prepared to assume

the very real risks of travel without the pas sport in order to gather the nev,rs, the
are performing a courageous service on behalf of the people of the United States,
It is indefensible for anyone in this government to seek to punish them for their
courage,
There are reports of new stirrings, both ideological and popular, within
Communist China,
hand.

These reports come to us third-hand, fourth-hand and fifth-

They may have great significance or they may have little significance for

the policies we are pursuing,

Does the Senate have any idea of the accuracy of

these reports or their implications?

Does the Executive Branch?

Yet the desire

of the press of the nation to begin to get some first-hand facts on which
independent evaluation of these reports, on which independent thought might be
based is treated by the Executive Branch as something akin to a high crime.

I at

aware, !Vir , President , that the Secretary has stated in press conferences that th
question of permitting newsmen to go to China is under consideration,

Is it a

question, however, which needs to be placed "under consideration" --under thi s
government term which is so often synonomous with indecision and delay?

That, kr. President, was one o rr_is sion in the :::e cretary of .State's speec
in ;:;an Francisco,

Tlwre Yras still another,

Nowhere is there a discussion of the

shi:£t jn British trade policy with respect to Communist China,

Yet that has been

one of the most significant developme nts in the Far Eastern situation in many
r•. onths,
The United :(ingdom has now lifted the ban on all e xp orts of goods to
China e;:;cept for actual implements of war,

How long w ill it be before other

nations of Y!estern Europe and Japan tak e the same path?

':!hat sicnificance does

this chance have in the e;eneral situation in the Far East?

Yfhat significance does

it have for the long ranr;e interests of the United States in that part of the world?
The :Jenate doec not have the answers to these questions.

I doubt very

much that the Executive Branch has the ansvters,
Iv.r. President, present _tJolicy with respect to China may or may not be
adequate for safeguarding the interests o:.': this country.
not l:now 1 ecause that policy is g ripped in a
i e;norance,

strait-jac~zet

Yle do not

~ :now .

'Je do

of e;ove rnment-enforc ed

For the first time in my recollection, public d i vo rc eme nt from

independent access to the facts has been e;lorified by an Administration o£ this
c overnment as an essential elen.ent of foreign policy and of international
morality,

I

I arr. hopeful that out of this divorcement will come a reconciliation.

I have every

confidence that Secretary Dulles will do what ha. not bee n done to date and that i s \

to bring the China press coverage incident to a conclusion in the near future.

~

r

-J..; ...

The lviiddle
I turn

ne~:t, Iv~r.

Palliatives of various

~ast

President, to policies

~~inds

respectin~

the

IV~iddle

East.

have been applied in that re gion in recent rDonths,

They have helped to restore a measure of calm.

The political fevers in the

Middle I:ast apparently have cooled or, in any event, are under better control,
Before they bee;in to rise ae;ain, however, I believe it is essential that action be
taken to get at the causes of the fever,
The basic p roblems of the Middle East, IvLr, President, are little
chanced from what they long have been,

lVJ.ore over, if the policy of this country

continues to follow the grooves of ancient habit, it is lE:ely to have little effect
these

problen~s .

sustaining the

Oi.

':Te shall continue to under-write the major part of the cost of

l~ rab

refugees as we have been doing for years at a cost of tens of

millions o:i dollars a year in public funds,

We shall continue to

~ive

some

economic aid here, some military aid there, and be accused on all sides of
miserliness or favoritisrr:,

I.'Te shall continue to rz.in outr2.:3ed moral castiga-

tions on the heads of the Russians for doin:3 what has been done 'uy a3gre s sive
nations in that re:;ion for centuries -- fishin c; in troubled waters, as though this
were the first time that it had happened,

\'le shall continue to shovver favors

indiscriminately on the e;overnrr.ents of the :Liddle East so lone: as they are
vocally anti-Communist.

H e ahall continue to give little consideration to

vthether or not these e; ove1·nrr::ents serve well and resi.Jonsibly so that they n.ight
have some claim on the loyalties of their peoples as a3ainst the appeal of
totalitarian comr.nunism.

V.'e shall continue to a'uhor the usc of force while \?e

-36minimize the factors which may have

provol~cd

its usc.

I do not v•ish to underestimate the complexity of the prob lerr.s of the
lv.iiddle East ,

I do not VJish to overestimate the capacity of this c;ove rnment to

resolve them .

V!hat is disturbing, however, is th:lt these problems still contain

the seeds of world conflict despite the surface calm in that region,

V!hat is dis-

turbing is that we have SFcnt untold sums of public funds and arc likely to spend
hundreds of millions of dollars more without perceptibly affectinG these seeds of
conflict.

~:.rhat

ic disturbing is that the Executive Branch does not appear to be

particul2..rly concerned by that prospect .
It seems to we , },.r , President, that if the people of thi s country are to

be e;(pected to support these expenditures in the

I\~iddle

East for much longer ,

there hacl better be sorr:e evidence that the eApenditures are not merely sustaining
an indefinite holdin3 action,
ducing positive
it

seerr~s

pro~re

There had better be some evidence that they are pro-

c s to'vtards peace in the lvliddle Eact .

to me, to establish a very close

lin:~

The time has come,

betvJee n the destination of aid

funds and the willinf{ness of the recipients to contribute to a permanent solution
of the p roblem of the J.rab refu;; ees and the ri:;ht of peaceful transit of Suez and
international waters in the region,

The tin'1e has come to apportion these funds

more than is no\t the case in terms of the
lV:iddle J::astern

~ overnments

vtelfare of their people ,

de ~ ree

of responsiveness of the various

to their people and their concern for the rie;hts and

The time has come to apportion these funds more in

term s of the dep·ee to which the nations of the re r;ion show a readiness to wor:::

-37for peace in the re gion rather than in terms of appeasement of the belligerent or
in t e rms of their artic'.llateness in

p r~ain J in g

The time has come perhaps to

seel~

their anti-communism.

international control over the arms

traffic in that re g ion, a traffic w hich is diverting the resources of the lv'iiddle
E ast from the desperate needs of their peoples,

The more arms are supplied to

that re gion, the more instability is induced and the more that expenditures by the
United States are required to maintain even a semblance of order,

That is the

formula the Soviet Union used to produce tl:e crisis at Suez a few months ago.
It is a formula that may now be making new crises in that re gion.

I should very

much like to see this country take the initiative in an attempt to alter it.

The Afro-Asian Nations.
I allude next, lV1r, President, to the so-called less developed areas of the
w orld, to the

c o ~mtries

of A sia and Africa.

Our policies, with respect to them, in

bro a d outline, are in my opinion the kind of policies which are mutually
advantag eous and helpful.

These policies support the concept of national freedom;

they support the concept of economic growth; they support the concept of collective
defense a c ainst totalitarian a g gression.
The r e cent visit of the distin3uished Chairman of the Committee on
Foreign Relations Jfilr. Greer_:_/ and a subsequent journey by the Vice President
to i..frica did much to clarify the p o sition of the United States w ith re s ard to that
continent.

Similar visits by members such as that of the distin 3uished Cenator

from IViinne sota /_~~r, Humphrey_/ to the Middle East and by others to the Far East,
have provided additional support for the position of this country,
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Despite the effort of these Members, despite the excellence of the
principles on which our policy is based, there is no denying the fact that our
relations with the less-developed areas, in practice, have not been as satisfactor
as they might be,

There has been disappointment and criticism on our side.

There has been suspicion and criticism on theirs.
Some friction is unavoidable in the relations between all nations.

It

seems to me, however, that the administration of our policies abroad has
contributed unnecessarily to this friction,

There have been inept statements by

various spokesmen of the Administration,

In an anxiety to convince the Afro-

Asian nations of the s ood intentions of the United States, moreover, the
Executive Branch, I believe, has sometimes sane too far,
with public relations,
military and economic,

It has overloaded ther

It has overloaded them, in some cases, with aid,
It has overloaded them with officials, military and

civilian,
The riotin s on Formosa, the anti-American demonstration in the
Philippines and elsewhere are warnings that should not go unheeded.

They are

warning s that the amount of official activity undertak en by this c ountry is not a
measure of sound relations.
This w arning has been raised many tir..-,es in the past by
b ody, who have travelled abroad.

:rv~ embers

of thi s

Ye t it has s ane unheeded in the Executive

Branch,
If there are to be sound relations with the .Afro - A sian nations they are

not g oin g to be purchased relations.

They are not going to be relatio!ls induced

- 39 by the

ler~ erdemain

of public relations,

They are not t,oinr:; to be relations built on

military assistc:.nce which raises the levels of armed forces far beyond the
capacity of the peoples of other countries to suy.port.
relc:.tions built on verbd professions of friendship.

'£.!:_ey are not goin c to be

They are not :::,oing to be

relations built by substitutinr, our efforts for the efforts of others, our
initiative for an initiative which must come from elsewhere,
'.1hat is r:eeded above all, Mr . President, is an administration of policies
c:.ffectin p; the less -developed ·which

n;a~~es

co - equal, in fact as v1ell as in v1ords ,
pro~~ rar"··

clear that we regard these nations as

Y!e need, in r:ractice, an information

that seel:s to inforr.r. not to saturc.te.

\}e need a Point Four program

v1hich encourages people-to - people technical exchanc;e on a mutual basis.
need stron :3 exchange -of-per S')nS progran,s, two - way ex chances,

vie

iile need an

economic aid-pro ? ram on a repayable basis that promotes economic independence
and responsibility, a pro;::ra.rD that promotes self-erowth not continuinG dependency
on this country.
the total

strate~y

'.fe need a militc.ry aid pror;ram VJhich is rationally adjusted to

of defense a 2ainst a2g1·ession, not a proro;ram which

rni~ht

ma:.:e

it convenient for irresponsible r.;overnments, in the name of anti -communisr.n , to
evade their responsibilities to their peoples b_y the aid-reinforced streneth of
their arr.oic s and police .

-~ !" e

need o£fic:.al United .States

countries T:.ept to a reasonable size.

re~Jre

sentation in these

U e need re presentatives who reflect in their

conduct the sincerity and the derr.ocracy of this country, not the pretenses of a
dyine colonialisrD,

Congress has done a c; r eat deal of what can be done to provide

a le::;islative basis for sound friendly and mutually advantaceous ties w ith the
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lees -developed countries.

It is up to the

;:;::~ecutive

Branch to administer this

le,:?;islation in a fashion which does in fact produce such ties.

Latin P. n,e rica
Re spec tina our relations v1ith the other n.er:ublics of the Americas, a
podtive approach to peace requires, not so ncuch a revision of policy as it does
a more dynamic

e}~pression

of policy.

-Jhether it is called "Good Neighbor"

or "Good Partner", the policy of the United .:::itate s ou3ht constantly to be
abreast of the chancing situation in the countries of Latin Lmcrica.

l~ept

It ought

constantly to see:( out '.uays, new ways for advancine the common interests of the
hemis ~)he re,

our interests and the interests of the "Good Neir;hbors" or "Good

:.='artners 11 ,
lv..r. President, the situation is chansinc in other parts of the
and it is changing rapidly.

The econor.nic

~ rowth

of many Latin Ameri can countri

countrie:::; in the p<:.st decade hac been Fhenomenal.
national consciousness.

i~mericas

·:.1 ith it, has come a gr ow ing

-,nth it, has come an increasin3 in:patiencc with self-

see:(ing, ruthleso dictatorship.

\.'ith it hac come a Gfreadins determination to

obtain responsible covernments cafable and v.rillin3 to serve the needs of all.
0ur policy nee ds to be tuned to these developments more acutely than is now the
case,

It needs to be tuned to the risinc; voice of the people of Latin J.rr.erica and

to treat, >lith appropriate scepticism, those vrho

seel~

to drown out th<:.t voice.

In a situation of chance such as now exists in Latin America, the opportunities are present to develop clocer ties in cor..-Jmerce and in culture, among
all the nations of thio herr.isphere.

Opp ortunities exist to do many thincs in
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common with the Latin

i~merican

countries, which will enrich the lives of the

peoples of all the American republics,

Even the basic machinery exists to

capitalize on these opportunities, in the Orsanization of the American States.
What is lacldne it seems to me is a realistic appraisal of the opportunities and the initiative to seize them.

Suggestions have been advanced in the

Senate and elsewhere pointing out avenues of cooperation which, at the least,
are worthy of the fullest exploration,

I should like to revive at this time two

such proposals which I made last year,

One called for an exploration of the

possibilities of establishing a University of the Americas, perhaps in the
Commonvvealth of Puerto Rico. The virtues of that island, as a kind of showcase
of enlightened den-. ocratic progress, have recently been discovered by some of
the spokesmen for the Administration,

They have found that Puerto Rico has

made extraordinary advances in the past two decades, that it is a natural point of
fusion for all of the cultures of the Americas,

I, personally, should like to see

a study made to determine whether it or some other centrally located place,
misht house a great University which vvould foster the interchange of the wisdom
and experience of all the nations of this Hemisphere,
I also suggested last year that the time may be coming to shift a

~reater

part of the responsibility for the Point Four technical assistance p roe;ram in this
hemisphere from a bi-lateral basis to a common

endeavor of the Or ganization

of American States. If this change were made the burden of the costs of the

-42pror;ram mi3ht well be

spn~ad

more equitably and the material returns from it to

all the l.merican republics might be e;reatly increased,

The intan c; ible gains in

goodwill and in the unity of the l1mericas, moreover, mi::;ht be even more valuable,

I do not knovt v1hethcr such a change is feasible,

I do know, however, that

nothing would be lost in exploring the possibility, explorine; it seriously with the
other

American repubEcs.
Similarly, there are other ideas which have been advanced in recent

years that merit the fullef.;t consideration.

Among these have been proposals for

a recional developr .t•nc banL and, more recently, for resional trade
arraneotnents.
It may be, i'<H, President , that in the field of Latin American :.·elations,
as in others, the S-.!natc throuch its members and Committees must seek to
supply the initiative which the Executive Branch lacks.
that has already been the case,
Senator from Florida

/'i. . r,

In at least one instance

Amendments introduced by the distineuished

Smathers 7 have done rnuch to insure more adequate

consideration of Latin 1 merica in the operations of the Foreign Aid Program,

The Soviet Union
Before concludina, Mr. President, I refer to our relations with the
Soviet Union.

It coes without oaying that this question transcends all other

issues of foreign policy,
\That is the state of these relations, Mr. President?

They are relations

characterized in official circles by fear, suspicion, hatred, bitterness, and
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.t-'etticl"::; s, not un tl1e R uo sian side alone, not on this side alone, but on both
sides,

They are relations held together by the slenderest thread of contact, by a

minimum of civility,
Yet on that contact, on that civility hangs the peace of the world.
that contact, on that civility rests the fate of mankind,
thread has been stretched to the breabng point.
Each time the thread has held.

On

More than once, the

Each tin1e the crisis has abated.

It has held, I believe, because to contemplate a

final rupture of the thread is to contemplate neither the annihilation of
totalitariarj communism alone, nor of free democracy alone, but the end of
human civilization as we have l:nown it,

Even the most ruthless of

authoritarians shrir.!::. from that prospect,
It may not a:ways be so, Mr. President,

madness can sever the thread,
11

There is no assurance that this so-called

Peace of mutual terror 11 will last forever,

peace is not peace at all,

A miscalculation, an act of

The fact is that this so -called

It is a desperate clinsing by fingertips to survival.

It is a tortured dance of diplomacy on the edge of the abyss,

It is a trembling

lieht of hope in an encirclinc darkness of unspeakable disaster,
Can we fL-x a firmer grip on survival?
path on which to walk?

Can we find a more secure

Can we strengthen the light?

Can we, in short , build a

more stable and secure peace than the peace of "mutual terror 11 ?
Earlier in these remarks, Mr. President, I expressed the view that
there never has been and probably never will be an absolute security for this
nation or any nation,

There are, however, degrees of insecurity.

The individual
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pursuit of absolute security by this nation, no less than the Soviet Union has led
both nations close to the maximum permissible degree of insecurity, short of the
total insecurity of nuclear war.
The level of insecurity has risen, despite the expenditures of hundreds
of billions of dollars by both sides to maintain swollen armed forces.

It has

risen, despite phenomenal advances in the scientific technology of war and
defense - even to the point of the almost-pure bomb -the 96% pure bomb - the
bomb that kills without the prolonged acony of radioactive poisoning.

The

insecurity has risen despite ten years of diplomatic jockeying for bases, for
allies and propagandistic advantage.
What have we to show for this enormous output of human energy?
have the Russians to ohow for it?
Are we?

Is the world better off?

Ylbat

Are the Russians?

At most, :tvir. President, the most that we can say is that we have

perhaps manaeed to keep the Russians a little more insecure than we are
ourselves.
I do not suggest,

1v~r.

President, that we could have done anything

much differently than we have during the past ten years,

The universal forces

which set in motion fears among whole peoples are still beyond human grasp,
Once they are in motion, there is no turning them aside until they have run their
course,
produce,

Governments must deal with the day-to-day eruptions which these fears
If military strength elsewhere threatens the safety of this nation what

else is there to do but to develop counter strength? If a g gressive diplomacy and
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propaeanda mark us as the target for eventual annihilation or the source of all
evil, do we have any choice but to respond in kind?
No, Mr. President, I cannot suggest that we go back and relive this past
decade of Soviet-American relations in another way even if that were possible,
What I do suggest is that w e look carefully at where we are now.

I sug gest that

we as lc ourselve s whether there is another road, not to the g oal of absolute
security, but to the g oal of relatively greater security for this nation and other
nations tha n is now enjoye d by any nation.

Is there, in short, a road to a more

stable p e ace?
I do not kno w , Mr. President, whether or not such a road exists,
noted earlier in m y remark s, it is not for us alone to find it.
underlie Soviet p oli c y are obviously a k ey factor.

As I

The attitudes which

In this connection, the recent

p olitical upheavals in Russia and the eastern European countries may facilitate
or impede the search.
Re gardless of the effect of these chan ges, however, I believe the road
to p e ace will not be found in another broad Summit Conference which obscures the
hard realities of peacemaking under the £littering generalities of peace.
It will not b e found in a fruitless search for an all-embracing disarmament

a ~ reement

vthich will guarantee in one strol-:e the absolute security of this

nation and all nations - a search which seeks to take the last step first,
It will not be found in prop a e;anda campaigns of mutual hate or even

mutual love betw een ourselves and the Russians,
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which put a premium

o~

ignorance of the facts about each country among the

people of the other .
It will not be found in a competition for the placing of petty restrictions
on the officials of each

c~untry

who must reside in the other to carry on the

legitimate business of their governments, and I stress the word legitimate.
It will net be found, this ,.oad to pl"!ace. if <>ither side assumes that any
concession to the othf"!"!.' {s i'1 i4;self a sign oJ: weakness or that any refusal to grant
a concession is in itse!f. an indication of

stren~th

- and the more adamant or

bellir,erent the rebsal, the r:reater the strength.
It will ~ot be f0'.md, finally, unless the policies of this country and the

Soviet Union recognize that the road to peace is infinitely to be preferred to the
continuin:, vercency and the ultirc1atc calamity of nuclear war.
If it is not to be found in these w ays, 1\llr, President, where then are

we to look for the road to a more durable peace?

Once a:::;ain, Mr . President, I

must emphasize that peace does not depend on the actions of this nation alone ,
The most that we can do is to pursue policies which will lead to peace if, in fact,
circumstances are ripe for it and others are prepared for it,
l~ey

I reiterate that t:ne

factor from the point of view of our own foreign policy is a creater reflexion

in that policy of the positive faith of the people of the United States .
Only the President, with such assi3tance as the Congress may be able
to r;ive him , is in a position to make that faith felt in official action,

It is to the

President that the people must turn for an assertion of that faith in the nation ' s
fore i en policy ,
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If the President provides the essential leadership then the first steps

towards a more durable peace have already been outlined by the distinguished
majority leader

L"ii:r.

Johnso~./ in his address in New York several weeks ago.

If the President provides the essential leadership he will see to it that these

proposals are not lost in the labyrinths of the Executive bureaucracy,

These

were not complex and improbable proposals which the able majority leader
advanced.

They were simple, reasonable proposals of a nature that expressed

the faith and confidence of the people of the nation.

They cut through the endless

prattle about peace and showed the way to action for peace.
The proposals called for an interchange of contact by radio, TV, and
other media between the people of the United States and Russia.

They called for

a small bite at the problem of control of arms, a cautious but very real bite,
rather than a mouthful of platitudes about the blessings of the elusive coal of
disarmament.
They were, in short, proposals which were designed to make clear that
the United States did not fear to lift the Iron Curtain, if the Russians were
prepared to raise it.

They were proposals designed to

mal~e

clear that the

United States understood the fears of the world concerning nuclear weapons and
was prepared for international action which would reflect that understanding,
These were eminently sound proposals, Mr. President, and to them, I
would add one more at this time.
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It seems to me

hi~h

time for an end to the petty restrictions which the

Soviet Union has placed on the reasonable freedom of movement of our official
representatives in that country and the recipro.cal restrictions which we have
placed on theirs in tl:is country,
If mature offici.als of both countries insist upon uehaving like schoolboys

in this limited matter, how are they to be expected to deal v1ith the complex
problems of vvar and peace?

I would lil-:e to see this r,overnment confident enough

and big enough to take the lead in trying to restore, on a
treatment of official

rcpr~ser;tatives

reciproc~l

basis, the

in both countries to a decent level of civility.

Concludinc Comments
Mr. President, I have rr.ade these lenethy remarl:s today because within
a few

weel~s,

the Cone,ress \Jill probably stand in adjournment until the new year.

The months ahead, when ve are away from the capital, will be decisive months,
They may witness new crises v;hich will again stretch the thin thread of peace,
Or the coming months may mark the beginninr;s of a nev.r stage of foreign policy.
It may be a staae in which the words of peace which echo from all nations are

translated into actions of peace by all nations.

It may be a stage in which the

President embar:· s, not on a crusade for peace, but on a rational search for ways
of reflecting more accurately the attitudes of the people of the United States in the
policy of the United States, a search for ways of reflecting less the fears and
uncertainties with which we li"Ve and more the faith and the confidence which
underlie the freedom and creatnes s of this country.
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he shall not lack for support in this body.
people of the United States.

He shall not lack for support among the

He shall, ih fact, mobilize that support Cind the

support of many nations to meet the great challenge of the remaining years of this
century.

That chailengc, Mr. Fresident, is to turn mankind from the dangerous

flirtation with human extinction which now goes on, to the work of constructing
the free institutions and the durable relations which will make possible a decent
life, a decent fulfillment for the people of this nation and all nations.
That is th8 challenge wr.ich confronts us, Mr. President.
of faith and of action.

'lh e can meet that challenge.

our peril, fail to meet it.

It is a challenge

We must not, at

